by Getachew Sisay
gsnigatu @ ucdavis.eduMarch 4, 2005
1. International Conventions and Ethiopian Water Policy
The diversity and number of river basins (around 245 world wide), large dependency of world population (about 40 % of the total), huge land mass encompassed with in the basin (about 50 %)and multiple and competing uses are the prominent reasons for the complexity of managing trans-boundary water resources (Salman and de Chazourners, 1998). The scarcity of fresh water for multiple societal needs is rapidly escalating and most remaining major exportable sources of fresh water are now in rivers (Elhance, 1999). This leads to the inherent controversies and conflicts in the utilization, distribution and appropriation of water resources shared by two or more sovereign states. The focus of this paper is to discuss about international conventions dealing with the non- navigational uses of Trans-boundary Rivers as Blue Nile a case.
1.1 International Water Conventions and Ethiopian Rights
International Law Association (ILA) is recorded as the nascent effort in the 1966 called Helsinki Rules. It gives much emphasis on the general principle of equitable utilization, which explicitly means that an existing user (Egypt) of the river(Blue Nile) would have to give way to a new user (Ethiopia) although the new user would have to pay compensation (Ohlesson, 1995). These are, however, non-binding recommendations used as an aid to countries involved in dispute over international waterways (Hillawi, 1998; Girma, 1997).
The first attempt in dealing the issue at comprehensive and universal level was devised by International Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations under the title of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
[1] (Salman and de Chazourners, 1998). By Resolution 51/229 of 21 May 1997, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted and opened for signature. Given the controversial and sensitive nature of the subject, it is not adopted in consensus (Fisseha, 1997). The vote was 103 in favor, 3 against (China, Turkey and Burundi) and 27 abstentions including Ethiopia.
For the sake of analysis, let look into the three crucial elements in the UN Convention for the point of view of this paper. As describe by McCaffrey (1998), these are the most important sets of general rules governing the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. These have subjective and qualitative implication for which verification and judgment is distinctly undependable. Much of the debates and resolutions in the utilization of trans-boundary rivers have revolved around them.
I) Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization
Article 5 of the convention has a title of Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation. McCaffrey (Ibid) called, “This principle is regarded as a cornerstone of law of international watercourses”. Ethiopia has not been utilized its right share from the Blue Nile, barely only 0.6 billion cubic meters for multi purpose compared with 55.5 billion of Egypt and 18.5 billion of Sudan. The participation of Ethiopia in the utilization is meager which has to be empowered in current situations by engaging in intensive exploitation of the resources for eminent equitability. This can be achieved by providing further right to Ethiopia to effectively utilize its resources.
II) No-Harm
Article 7 of the convention has the title of obligation not to cause significant harm. It has two important connotations: the allocation of the watercourses and the protection of the environment. For the former, it is evident that the share of Ethiopia is a fraction of what has been given for evaporation (10 to 16 billion cubic meters) and seepage losses at Lake Nasser. In regard to environmental aspect, protecting and conserving Blue Nile at the highlands of Ethiopia can increase the availability of the river of either of the countries. Constructing a reserve dam at Lake Tana in Ethiopia enables to maintain the hydrological cycle and stable supply of water to all states than any where in the basin (Elhance, 1999; Allan, 1999). Evaporation loss in Ethiopian Highlands is estimated about 4 billion cubic meters per annum compared with 12 billion in Egypt desert. The rampant problem of siltation in the dams and irrigation canals in Egypt has been brought by lack of necessary conservation mechanism in the Ethiopian highlands. Needless to say, intensive use and dependence of Egypt on the Nile water creates significant obstacle for Ethiopia not to use as what it likes.
Hillawi (1998) expressed his fear on the misinterpretations of this rule by describing that it may imply the acceptance of first-come-first-serve system, with the users presumably having been first to utilize the water resources in question. When analyzing this rule as one of the vital component of the UN Convention in relating with the Blue Nile, Calfisch again states as follows:
If it were the only one to apply, it would fully protect the status quo, that is, the existing rights of the lower riparian- first and foremost Egypt and, to a lesser degree, the Sudan- and deny the upper riparian- first and foremost Ethiopia- any possibility of developing and expanding activities. In other words, the economic and social growth of any new comer, in particular upstream countries, would be stunted (Calfisch, 1998).
III) Vital Human Need
In addition, the formation of the Article 10 of the convention, Vital Human Needs, offers Ethiopia the legitimate right to use its water. The convention defines Vital Human Needs as “Special attention is to be paid to providing sufficient water to sustain human life, including both drinking water and water required for production of food in order prevent starvation”. No more robust reason can be found in any where than eradication of drought and famine as vital human needs. Conflicts can be effectively resolved by offering special regards to this article.
From the above realities, it can be easily deduced that these imperatives enable Ethiopia to be beneficial from its resources for sustainable development. However, one of the downside of this convention is that it is deliberately designed to protect the upstream countries since any project has to be approved by all concerned states. I would like to call it as ‘The unjust nepotism part of the UN convention’. In any rational and righteous situation, past history and hostility undoubtedly depicted that Egypt by no means approves any projects in Ethiopia (Elhance, 1999; Daniel, 1999). Ethiopia is one of the countries, which firmly objects this part of the convention (McCaffrey, 1998). This is one of the dreadful bottlenecks specifically for Ethiopia to get necessary assistance from the financial institutes and donors.
1.2 Ethiopian National Water Policy
Lack of clearly stated water policy was one of the limiting factors in underutilization of the water resources. To overcome these problems, in history, Ethiopia has launched its first Water Resources Management Policy in July 2000 (FDRE- MWR
[2], 2000). It has been recorded as the verge points to wards the utilization of the resources and the step to confront the complicated and deep-rooted Blue Nile conflict of interest. The policy describes about general water resources and sectoral policies including irrigation, hydropower, and water and sanitation policies. It also consists of crosscutting topics such as debatable trans-boundary aspects, ground water resources, watershed managements, water allocation, water quality, technology and engineering and disaster and emergencies.
The Federal Government of Ethiopian Proclamation No. 197/2000 states, “All water resources of the country are the common property of the Ethiopian people and the state.” (Ibid). The overall goal of this historical policy is to enhance and promote efforts towards efficient, equitable, and optimal utilization of the available water resources and contributes to the country’s socio-economic development in a sustainable basis.
The ultimate choice for the utilization of Ethiopian water resources is not only in the hand of the country, however. It has gained the attention and immediate follow up of Egypt. History clearly reveals that Egypt has been always standing against any development endeavor of Ethiopia since time immemorial. There is a long-live debate and conflict of interest particularly on Blue Nile between the two countries including Sudan. The policy lacks the capacity and intended strategies to deal precisely these Hydro-policies aspects. It is a naïve description than possible planned action.
1.3 Blue Nile Treaties and Conflict of Interest
One of the peculiar features in management and allocation of Nile River is the absence of single term of agreement or treaty that represents all of the ten riparian states (Hillawi, 1998; Hultin, 1995; Girma, 2000). The practical application and acceptability of the existing partially established treaties are not back up by any comprehensive agreement of all riparian countries and hence lacking enforcement power. The governing power and conflict solving capacity is, therefore, uncertain and inefficient. This is not, in fact, different from the global experience as described by Elhance (1999).
The current status of affairs with the use and distribution of Nile water in general and Blue Nile in particular is based on several historical agreements. Some of them were formulated and signature by the colonial administer of the regions. Allan (1999) briefly explained that the water of the Nile Basin was influenced by the United Kingdom, which directly or indirectly controlled the political economy of the basin. The surprising character of these treaties is that almost all of them were intentionally crafted to benefit Egypt and offered unlimited freedom to dominate and be a monopoly superpower in the region. The British is responsible for the ever-arising conflict that would happen since it is the main architects of these treaties (Daniel, 1999).
Discussion on some of the treaties on Blue Nile is sufficient to grasp and understand the conflict of interests on the whole watercourse of the Nile since the lion’s share of the Nile water is from the Blue Nile. The case of Blue Nile is sufficiently enough to explain the cause for the inability of Ethiopia to use other potential water resources. In addition, Ethiopia is the only never colonized country for which none of treaties signed on its foot. For seek of clarity those treaties that are prominent source of conflicts, where Ethiopia is being part or affected by, was dealt briefly in chorological sequences.
I) The 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Accord
This accord was made between the Ethiopian King and Great Britain (for Sudan). The main framework of this agreement was in Article III where the Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia promised,“ not to construct or allowed to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat (Baro) …” (Berber, 1959; Hillawi, 1998). Since Britain is no more represent Sudan, the agreement was never ratify by Ethiopia Crown Council or British Parliament (Daniel, 1999) and the situation on the use of water have changed dramatically rendering the inapplicability of the article (Girma, 1997).
II) The 1925 Anglo-Italian Exchange of Notes
After the failure of another 1906 Tripartite Treaty (among British, Italy and France), British, however, continued to pursue vigorously its interest in controlling the headwater of the Blue Nile. This was the stealth agreement between Britain and Italy for which Ethiopia had denounced the secret deal and brought the matter before the then League of Nations (Daniel, 1999)
[3]. The agreement, inter alia, had thought to recognize the prior hydraulic right of Egypt and the Sudan (Hillawi, 1998).
III) The 1929 Nile Agreement between Egypt and Britain (Sudan)
The exchange of agreement took place between Great Britain and Egypt. The main contested part was “no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the river Nile and its branch or on the lakes from which it in so far as all these are in the Sudan or in countries under British administration” (Barber, 1959). Pessimistically, the doom feature of this accord was the British acknowledgement of the natural and historic right of Egypt and safeguarding of those rights as a fundamental principle of its policy. As defended by Barber (ibid) these are strictly the opposite of legal rights and fundamental principle of international law. Since Ethiopia had never been a British colony, or any other, this agreement had no legal effect (Daniel, 1999). Girma (1997) stated Ethiopian position, “According to the principle of treaty making, a treaty made between two parties cannot have a binding effect on a third party without res inter alios acta”.
IV) The 1959 Agreement between Sudan and Egypt
Even though the previous treaties had their own potential conflict of interests, the conflict has attained its zenith and intolerable limit at this time when almost fully water recipient Egypt and Sudan agreed a so-called ‘Full Utilization of the Nile Water’. Besides, it is still a puzzle how the agreement between two nearly non-water contributories, among ten countries, can claim full utilization. The agreement was designed to allocate 55.5 billion cubic meters (75%) to Egypt and 18.5 billion cubic meters (25%) to Sudan (Hillawi, 1998; Daniel, 1999; Girma, 1997; Elhance, 1999). Girma (2002) describes this unfair scrap as “Nile starts in Sudan and ends in Egypt”. According to Allan (1999) the core objective of this agreement was Egypt’s wish to control Ethiopian flood by creating storage at its southern border with Sudan.
Egypt found it important to seek guarantee from Sudan and international recognition for financing and technology of the dam by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) - the World Bank group. The central point is that why do provision had not been taken for upstream riparian states where their land offers this blessing. What did they rely on to do so? What do force upstream countries simply give their blessing while they are severely affected by drought and famine? Why did the World Bank, IBRD, give greater consideration to the right of Egypt? It is still a mystery but indicates its robust affiliation and support.
More strikingly, more than four decades later, Egypt and Sudan have alleged that the agreement still serve as a binding for the Nile Basin River (Hillawi, 1998). It has plainly displayed the historical and profound negligence of Egypt and Sudan towards other upstream countries. Generally speaking, this agreement could be criticized as being too rigid and incomprehensive. Rigid in a scene that, it didn’t take into account the underlining environmental, socio-economic and political changes that the basin countries experienced. (Hultin, 1995). It didn’t give any alternative loophole for further negotiation and then cooperation. This has aggravated the existing conflicts. Besides, all concerned countries didn’t participate or consulted or ratify in the process, hence it lacked comprehensiveness.
1.4 Egypt and Hydro-politics on Blue Nile River
One of the leading experts in the area, Elhance, defines hydro-politics as “a systematic study of the conflict and cooperation between states over water resources that transcend international borders” (Elhance, 1999). It is apparent that states sharing rivers or lakes or even ground waters naturally form highly interdependent unit in many aspects. Hence economic, political, social, cultural and secular dynamics are intimately tied to the hydro-politics. More significantly, in the condition of external influence, unfair allocation, over exploitation by few states, and natural and non natural trend in the increasing scarcity of water have led the hydro-politics of the region more and more sever. Some times, countries could engage in armed conflict to maintain their national interest.
The main player in the hydro-politics of the Nile River in general and the Blue Nile in particular is definitely Egypt. In historical opportunities and under the auspices of strong alliance, Egypt has dominated and led the hydro-politics of this poor region. One can easily confirm this fact by looking its policies and the speech addressed by its leaders. Needless to say, without the water of Nile, Egypt is totally a vast desert land (98% of the total land except small Mediterranean strip and the narrow Nile valley). Its civilization and development depends on the Nile.
As early as the fourth century B. C., Herodotus observed that Egypt was a gift of the Nile (But Nile is not a gift of Egypt) (Daniel, 1999). No country in the world, however, is more dependent on irrigated agriculture than Egypt (Hultin, 1995). In addition, Nile is a source of hydroelectric power, drinking and sanitation water, industrial bases, tourism, and fishing. The ability of Egypt to get the monopoly power over Nile has helped to control the hydro-politics of the region. In like manner, this enables to build up what is need for the development of the country. It has favored to vest power for facilitating and manipulating legal, environmental, social, economics and political concerns in the benefit of itself, some times to Sudan. Diplomatic efficiency, the availability of potential human resources and the attachment with influential countries and donors and their affiliation are some of the inherent strength to exploit the resources than any riparian. Egypt has extra ordinary skill to judge and balance the international politics along its national priority.
For its national priority, it has definitely persuaded opposite political direction with Ethiopia. During the Emperor regime of Haile Selasea I, Ethiopia had close relation with USA. The counterpart, Egypt had hand-glove relation with the former Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Zionist Soviet Union and East Germany. By using its close tie, it was able to construct the gigantic Aswan High Dam. At Ethiopian Socialist era, Egypt converted to the Western bloc, moreover attracted the immediate attention of USA and stands next to Israel, the second economic and military support beneficiary.
In addition, the representatives of Egypt have reflected the hydro-politics and the subsequent conflict of interest in various occasions. Late President Anuar Sadat warned Ethiopia, “Any action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will be faced with firm reaction on the part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to war” (Daniel, 1999). In 1979 just after signing the peace treaty with Israel, he added, “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water” (Hultin, 1995).
The former UN Secretary General Mr. Butrous Butrous Ghali is widely known by his repeated anxiety about the conflict on the Nile. At time when he was Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he made the following speech, “The national security of Egypt, which is the based on the water of the Nile, is in the hand of other African countries (Ethiopia). The next war in our region will be over the water of the Nile” (Ibid). I am witness that the current president Hussen Moubarak has threatened to bomb Ethiopia if it plans to build any dams on the Blue Nile.
Egypt has a firm conviction that the new instrument should by no way affect the existing ridiculous water agreement (Caflish, 1998). It has continued in the implementation of huge and extensive projects even by diverting the natural flow of the Nile without consulting other rightful riparian countries. For country that has such extremist stand expecting negotiation, cooperation, and equitable utilization in a peaceful manner is reliably absurd. That is why, until now, the hydro-polices of Nile water is a Zero-Sum game win by Egypt. Tony Allan, a leading scholar and scientists on the water issue in general and the Nile in particular, pointing out the injustice in the Egyptian position and calls the plan ‘preposterous, a national fantasy’ (Kinfe, 2000b).
With its firm conviction of the 1959 so called ‘Full Utilization’, Egypt is generally unwilling to have any further negotiation. Moreover, it obsolete fashioned doctrine of ‘primary need, prior user and acquired water user’ is the impediment for any agreements. Frequency of drought, climatic changes and population pressure in Ethiopia lead to enviable demand of Nile water than any time before. Hence, pessimistically, the existing conflict of interests, even war, would continue as far as Egypt’s position is towards only maintaining its unilateral national affairs.
1.5The Position of Ethiopia on Nile issues
Ethiopia has never ever accepted unilateral agreements for their perilous prejudice. According to Hillawi (1998), during 1959 it claimed, “Ethiopia has reserved the right to utilize the water resources of the Nile for the benefit of its people, whatever might be the measure of such waters sought by riparian states”. Irrespective of the type of regime in Addis Ababa, the position of Ethiopia is one and one - to have a win- win solution and legitimate right to use the Nile water for the socio-economic development of the country and the region as a whole. In addition to the historical reference of ‘natural and territorial right’, Ethiopia has to utilize its water to feed the people. No one is requested to offer this legitimate right at all.
Ethiopia has a firm belief of accepting negotiation in good faith and confidence, on the basis of equitable utilization. Through this, the riparian states of the Nile can avoid the danger of engaging in competitive and conflicting use of the water. Ethiopia needs a flexible and comprehensive agreement that takes in to account the socio-economic and natural conditions of the riparian in the shortest possible time. According to Ethiopia, efficient utilization based on research and conserving the environment for sustainable uses should be adopted for mutual benefit of all.
The president of Ethiopian International Institute of Peace and Development (EIIPD), Professor Kinfe Abreha, expresses the Ethiopian status as follows:
In any genuine attempt to tackle the problem of food and energy, Ethiopia has no option but effectively use her Nile waters for consumptive and non-consumptive purposes. There is no legal or institutional obligation, which detracts Ethiopian policy makers as well as planners from fulfilling this duty in the best interest of their people (Kinfe, 2000b).
This is also in line with the UN convention on the equitable and sustainable utilization of the country’s resources with in its territory as an attribute to its sovereignty. Nevertheless, while the right of Ethiopia to utilize its water resources remains valid, its desire to reach an agreement on allocation has persisted for the simple reasons that it is firmly committed to peace and a win-win situation, which can be derived from cooperation (Ibid).
2 Remarks on Developmental Use of Water Recourses
2.1 Political Solution
Any development effort with regard to water in Ethiopia has been seen by Egypt as a treat to its national concern. Elhance (1999) expresses this issue, “As in the case of Egypt, many economic, political and technical impediments stands in the way of Ethiopia being unable to fully exploit these reserves to relieve ongoing and impending water shortages”. Most importantly, the practical application these guiding UN Convention do require cooperation among riparian countries. But in condition where there are no international agreements regarding the use of Nile water for common benefit of all riparian states, achieving cooperation is hardly possible (Hultin, 1995; Girma, 2000).
Making the country beneficiary from the Nile is more of political than economic or social issues. The pinnacle aspect is resolving the hydro-political conflict of interest with Egypt in diplomatic ways through ‘win- win’ strategies. By any means, it is the right time to grasp the nettle. The political priority and efficiency directly leads to financial accessibility in international donors and lending institutions. However, at least for the short-term, the domestic capital to materialize some potential poverty reduction activities should have to be searched by reducing government expenditure from unproductive sectors, for instance, defense.
In addition, the involvement of Egypt in creating dispute, unrest and war should be dealt in a great caution and require strong national commitments. This is expressed in Elhance (1999) word, “Egypt has on occasion been accused of fomenting dissent and helping rebellions in Sudan and Ethiopia”. The government of Ethiopia has to realize the fact that the overt and covert policy of Egypt is to weaken the country to the extent of making incapable of tempering with water of Nile, and as a result to have unrestricted utilization of Nile Water. In its efforts, it has able to prevent loans and grants. As the same time, it cannot politicallyand morally afford to let millions to starve for fear of the cost of conflict on the predicament condition of demographic alarm and catastrophic drought (Kinfe, 2000a).
2.2 Regional Cooperation
In the history of Nile basin hydro-politics, all the ten countries of the Nile have officially launched the institution of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) by adopting and signing the minute on 22 February 1999 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The head quarter in Entebbe, Uganda, was publicly opened in September 1999. The main objective of NBI is to promote socio-economic cooperation and development through further cooperation, dialogue, exchange and integration of the Nile countries in their quest for development and poverty eradication (taken from NBI web site). The crucial element has been to achieve sustainable socio-economics development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile basin water resources and to secure development fund for integrated development.
The designed Projects should take into account the interest of all riparian for subsequent financing. Up to now, the World Bank, Canadian International Development Agency (CDIA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other multilateral and bilateral organizations have shown interest. After making the necessary support for Egypt, the World Bank and some donors have latterly deserved the positive confirmation for all riparian countries to extend loan and grant for project planned in the basin.
The scopes of the intended projects in the NBI are more of macro-type that focuses on the utilization of the resource in interstate bases than meeting the dire need of small-scale utilization. This is, in fact, not directly in line with the poverty reduction approach and implementation. Then the contribution of the NBI in poverty reduction would be very minimal. The pace for the execution of these programs is also very slow due to lack of fund and conflict arises due to inherent nature of the basin. Even thought it is at initial stage, there is no promising physical performance that can be cited as the result of the initiative and to envisage for future prospect at least for the short-run.
Moreover, for full and efficient functioning of the NBI, the 1959 agreement should be unanimously abandon once and for all. This is because, it is the area where most of the conflict starts and ends and opposes national sovereignty of riparian. This agreement has brought fire than light to cooperation and a catalyst to the conflicts over the right of Nile water. Therefore, new form of agreement based on the socio-economic development, comparative advantages and political realities, that will be dynamic enough to accommodate changes, need to be adopted. Commitment of every country has offered further ground for the development of mutual trust and confidence.
2.3 Development Aid and Future Direction
About 35% of the developmental aid to Ethiopia has been allocated for food aid and other emergency purposes. This implies pronounced amount of foreign aid has been propelled to save life as consumption in the form of transfer. While the costly and temporary, these efforts have generally perceived as necessary short-term intervention but precluded support for long-term development process. Pessimistically, the kind of funding needed to develop water potentials is simply beyond Ethiopians means. International financial institutions and donors, which have been instrumental in helping Egypt and Sudan to develop millions of hectares, are unwilling to extend a fraction of long-term base assistance to Ethiopia. Allan compared the effort of these institutions to upstream and downstream:
As upstream countries (like Ethiopia) are compelled to borrow money in order to finance hydroelectric, irrigation and sanitation development projects, they are subject to the rules and polices of the lenders, and it doesn’t appear that these lenders necessary adhere to the rule of international law when they are assessing the viability of downstream (Egypt). This raises the issue that developing nations, in order to fund necessary development, must resort to incurring debts to organizations which have predominantly commercial consideration at heart (Allan, 2002).
The leading development financer, the World Bank, is constrained by its own rule of Operational Policies (OP 7.50) and Bank Procedures (BP 7.50) that prevents the funding of water projects (Allan, 2001). Potential donors have to look the economic backwardness and the frequent vulnerability of the people rather than sticking to laws and regulations. In addition, it is unwise that development schemes do not deserve assistance because there is disagreement among the watercourses states or because they are likely to cause harm (Caflish, 1998). Close follow up in line with the prevailing socio-economic conditions in a dynamic manner is expected from these types of institutions.
If the World Bank and other donors have genuinely perceived ‘a world free of poverty’, they have to respond to the immediate needs of Ethiopia in a much responsible and flexible ways. The approaches should focus on dealing and resolving directly on the actual causes of poverty than ‘wandering around the bush’. The prior step should be in supporting the development of water potentials. In so doing, it is necessary to apply different principles and approaches for Ethiopia and Egypt. This is due to the fact that, the latter country is comparatively more develop enough to finance projects itself and has so many disposable potential sources like the Arab World, the USA and Private funds (Allan, 2001). Hence, the World Bank and donors have to see countries, especially Ethiopia and Egypt, in different ‘eye glasses’. Aid should be directed to projects that have comparative advantage to the region as well.
3.4 Cost Effectiveness
One of the formidable reasons restricting water resource development in Ethiopia is the high cost associated with the implementation of projects. But the financial costs and benefits should not be the exclusive yardstick in assessing the feasibility of these projects. Evaluating of such development projects in term of the orthodoxy Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is neither sound nor morally acceptable. In the current situation of the country, it is indispensable to assess the feasibility in multi-dimensional ways. Hence the suffering and the displacement of millions people should be grasped in Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) than in the conventional profitability analysis. The wider public benefits of disaster mitigation functions should be recognized in assessing the feasibility Hence, more correct economic and social CBA that takes in to account the uses of water resources for saving the life of people is desirable to assess the soundness and relevance of appraisal.
In addition, if investments are directed to agriculture, rural development and other water using sectors that generate direct income to the poor communities, then the implementation of watershed management action plans can genuinely contribute to poverty reduction, pro-poor. Sufficient budgetary needs to be allocated to the water sector without considering its immediate financial profitability. Governmental incentive and tax systems need be reviewed in light of the growing awareness of the linkages between poverty reduction and water resources development. The issue of sustainability has to be dealt in line with providing basic necessity for the current productive forces for the better off of the future generation. In other word, the water resources of the country have to play vital role for the better off of drought struck farmers.
Hence, the economic systems should include sustainable development in their planning phases with respect to the above realms. Moreover, Willingness to Pay depends on the availability of efficient and effective institutions and facilities that enables to transfer the produces of the farmers in to income at reasonable prices and time. If this is so, economics benefits of Ethiopian water resources development is both compromising and sound in terms of poverty reduction and the well-being of the people whatsoever the financial costs be.
3.5 Institutional Settings
One commentator who observes the various negotiation and meeting of the Nile countries remarks that Ethiopian delegation in the meeting varies and reflects different aspect in scramble manners. However, for the Egypt side almost the last thirty and forty years, the same personals have led the delegation and have consistent stand in every aspect. This has been well stated by Allan (2001) as “the options for Ethiopia in the utilization of its water resources are constrained by institutional incapability”.
Therefore, very much responsive and active water resources based institutions should be needed for efficient utilization. In time where, the conflict of interest on Blue Nile reached at its climax, well organized and persistent institution consist of multidisciplinary professionals is deemed indispensable. Supportive institutions facilitating land redistribution, resettlement and tenure security should be part of integrated water resources development of Ethiopia. A proactive public agency is necessary if the country’s water resources are to be utilized effectively and in sustainable way.
At lower level, concerned effort should be made to encourage small-scale and user-based water development schemes. Water resources management for poverty alleviation is highly dependent on the empowerment of communities. Such schemes are less costly, more sustainable, environmentally friendly, and don’t involve human displacement, as oppose to large schemes. Appropriate state institutions at the grass-root levels can make a bigger dent in the transaction costs.
3.6 Technological Options
Agricultural productivity growth and transformation processes have universally involved transformation from traditional resources based agricultural to scientific practices through appropriate technology. It is widely known from the Green Revolution that new productive technologies contained irrigation schemes as integral part. Technological transformation should favor toward attaining comparative advantage by analyzing the prevailing natural resources. Specifically, appropriate technology generation and dissemination have to reflect the available water resources potential. Not only water utilization but also soil and water conservation and environmental sustainability issues should be dealt concurrently.
In Ethiopian situation, labor-intensive technologies rather than massive investment in mechanization have priority in agricultural development of small-scale targeted poverty schemes. Moreover small schemes provide beneficiaries the opportunity to manage themselves. If this is successfully done, the ultimate goal of agricultural development through the small-scale beneficiary based schemes will result food security and then poverty reduction. Agricultural technology using voluntary and participatory involvement of members through cooperatives is also one possible alternative for integrated development of these resources.
3 Conclusions
According to the FAO estimation and prepared master plan, Ethiopia has about 3.5 million hectares of easily irrigable land. (FAO, 1997). Ethiopia has so far been able to develop 2% of hydropower (from 176 billion-kilowatts) and 1 % of irrigation potential from the Nile system. Using the Nile basin, Ethiopia has the potential to extend irrigation for about 2.2 million hectares [the Nile basin (Abbai, Tekezzae and Northen and Baro-Akobbo) accounts about 64 % of these potential]. The basin area is known for repeated famine and drought. According to one commentator, “The root of Ethiopian low utilization of its resource in the Nile is Poverty”.
One of the solutions of poverty reduction in Ethiopia should target embarking the utilization of this untapped resource. Without the necessary component factor of agricultural production, water, the envisage goals would continue to appear on paper, since it neglects the core component towards Blue Nile development. The overwhelming disaster and ever increasing population are the alarm to painstakingly concentrate efforts on the employment of necessary projects by making use of the Nile. The cost of prevailing disaster and future catastrophe would be far precipitous other wise. How?
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www.nilebasin.org/index.htmOHLESSEN, Lief.(ed.) (1995) Hydropolitics: Conflicts Over Water as a Development Constraints. Atlantic Highlands: New Jersey.
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[1] The UN convention document treats international rivers and watercourses as synonymous and defines as a system of surface water and ground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole.
[2] FDRE-MWR means Federal Decomocratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Water Resources.
[3] Ethiopia became the member of League of Nations in 1923.
