ICE Case StudiesCase Number:
Case Identifier: BLUE NILE
Case Name: Nile River Dispute
Abstract
The Nile is the world's longest river, and an estimated 123 million people depend on the Nile waters for survival. The river originates from two distinct geographical zones, the basins of the White and Blue Niles. The source of the White Nile is in the Great or Equatorial Lakes Region, and is also fed by the Bahr-el-Jebel water system to the north and east of the Nile-Congo Rivers divide.(6) Its catchment area includes the riparian states of Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Congo/Zaire, Kenya and Sudan. The Blue Nile originates in the highlands of Ethiopia and Eretria, as do the other major tributaries of the Nile, the Atbara and the Sobat. About 85% of the Nile's waters originate in Ethiopia and Eretria, while the majority of the river's water is used in the Sudan and Egypt.
Irrigated agriculture is the largest draw on the waters of the Nile, particularly in Egypt and the Sudan. Pressure on Nile resouces is likely to increase dramatically in the coming years as a result of high population growth rates in all riparian states, and increasing development-related water needs in Ethiopia.
In 1929, the Nile Waters Agreement was concluded through an exchange of notes between the British High Commission in Cairo and the Egyptian government. The agreement heavily favored Egypt's "historic rights" allocating for Egyptian use 48 bcm per year, only 4 bcm for the Sudan, and leaving 32 bcm per year unallocated. The period 1954-1958 was characterized by political conflicts between Egypt and the Sudan over sharing of the Nile waters. As noted by Ashok Swain, Sudan achieved independence in 1956, and its first Prime Minister "immediately reiterated that the 1929 agreement should be revised, just when Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt was contemplating the creation of a massive new dam at Aswan." Tensions increased between Egypt and the Sudan in 1956-1958, as the Sudan voiced further objections to the Aswan High Dam and continued demanding a renegotiation of the 1929 agreement. Egypt subsequently withdrew its support for the Sudanese project to build a reservoir at Roseires on the Blue Nile, and Sudan unilaterally declared its non-adherence to the 1929 agreement. In a show of force, Egypt moved units of its army to the border with Sudan.
In November 1958, there was a military takeover in Sudan and the establishment of a regime more open to negotiation with the Egyptian government. Within a year, the two countries re-negotiated the 1929 agreement and developed the 1959 Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic. The new agreement set Egypt's share of Nile waters at 55.5 bcm per year and allocated to the Sudan's an allotment of 18.5 bcm per year. Other riparians were not included in this agreement. Favorable relations between the two continued until the ouster of Sudanese President Nimeiri, and relations further deteriorated in 1989 as the Islamic fundamentalist regime unilaterally abolished the cooperation agreements and began supporting anti-Egyptian forces in its territory. In recent years, disputes between Egypt and the Sudan have been more overtly political and less about water, in part because the Sudan's civil strife has halted significant development in this country.
Present and potential conflict over water in the basin stems from the increased food and agricultural needs generated by a rapidly growing population in the riparian states. Egypt is desperately trying to meet its food needs through dramatically expanding the number of acres under irrigation, and has started two new, major irrigation projects. However, Egypt is already at or above its allocation of Nile water under the 1959 Agreement, and some sources claim that it is taking up to 2 bcm more than its share.
Ethiopia is the new unknown in the conflict equation, as the end of the Ethiopian civil war has opened the doors to new development. Rapid population growth and the need to establish food security after the famines of the 1980s have prompted Ethiopia to press ahead with plans to divert Nile waters for irrigation.
Previous efforts to establish cooperation among riparians have been limited by Ethiopia, who usually would only participate as an observer. Although hydrological surveys and basin- management efforts have been partially successful, Ethiopia's refusal to participate has seriously limited their utility, as 85% of the Nile's waters come from the Ethiopian highlands. Moreover, Ethiopia and Egypt exchanged fairly non-cooperative policy papers at a 1996 conference on Nile cooperation, each asserting its rights to use Nile water as it sees fit.
At the current time, tensions in the Nile River Basin are contained by a number of factors, including Egypt's political and military dominance, the civil war in the Sudan and negligible use of water by other upstream riparians. Concurrently, however, other factors are working to increase the potential for conflict over water in the basin: high population growth in both upstream and downstream countries, accompanied by subsequent demand for increases in agricultural irrigation; nascent development in Ethiopia; environmental degradation of established Egyptian irrigated land; and the possibility of an eventual end to the Sudanese war, which would spur development in Sudan. Although each of the above factors holds the potential to increase tension and cause conflict in the basin, many also represent potential areas of cooperation. Prevention of armed conflict in the Nile basin could occur in a great number of realms, from the technical to the political, from domestic solutions to regional solutions. more
Irrigated agriculture is the largest draw on the waters of the Nile, particularly in Egypt and the Sudan. Pressure on Nile resouces is likely to increase dramatically in the coming years as a result of high population growth rates in all riparian states, and increasing development-related water needs in Ethiopia.
In 1929, the Nile Waters Agreement was concluded through an exchange of notes between the British High Commission in Cairo and the Egyptian government. The agreement heavily favored Egypt's "historic rights" allocating for Egyptian use 48 bcm per year, only 4 bcm for the Sudan, and leaving 32 bcm per year unallocated. The period 1954-1958 was characterized by political conflicts between Egypt and the Sudan over sharing of the Nile waters. As noted by Ashok Swain, Sudan achieved independence in 1956, and its first Prime Minister "immediately reiterated that the 1929 agreement should be revised, just when Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt was contemplating the creation of a massive new dam at Aswan." Tensions increased between Egypt and the Sudan in 1956-1958, as the Sudan voiced further objections to the Aswan High Dam and continued demanding a renegotiation of the 1929 agreement. Egypt subsequently withdrew its support for the Sudanese project to build a reservoir at Roseires on the Blue Nile, and Sudan unilaterally declared its non-adherence to the 1929 agreement. In a show of force, Egypt moved units of its army to the border with Sudan.
In November 1958, there was a military takeover in Sudan and the establishment of a regime more open to negotiation with the Egyptian government. Within a year, the two countries re-negotiated the 1929 agreement and developed the 1959 Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic. The new agreement set Egypt's share of Nile waters at 55.5 bcm per year and allocated to the Sudan's an allotment of 18.5 bcm per year. Other riparians were not included in this agreement. Favorable relations between the two continued until the ouster of Sudanese President Nimeiri, and relations further deteriorated in 1989 as the Islamic fundamentalist regime unilaterally abolished the cooperation agreements and began supporting anti-Egyptian forces in its territory. In recent years, disputes between Egypt and the Sudan have been more overtly political and less about water, in part because the Sudan's civil strife has halted significant development in this country.
Present and potential conflict over water in the basin stems from the increased food and agricultural needs generated by a rapidly growing population in the riparian states. Egypt is desperately trying to meet its food needs through dramatically expanding the number of acres under irrigation, and has started two new, major irrigation projects. However, Egypt is already at or above its allocation of Nile water under the 1959 Agreement, and some sources claim that it is taking up to 2 bcm more than its share.
Ethiopia is the new unknown in the conflict equation, as the end of the Ethiopian civil war has opened the doors to new development. Rapid population growth and the need to establish food security after the famines of the 1980s have prompted Ethiopia to press ahead with plans to divert Nile waters for irrigation.
Previous efforts to establish cooperation among riparians have been limited by Ethiopia, who usually would only participate as an observer. Although hydrological surveys and basin- management efforts have been partially successful, Ethiopia's refusal to participate has seriously limited their utility, as 85% of the Nile's waters come from the Ethiopian highlands. Moreover, Ethiopia and Egypt exchanged fairly non-cooperative policy papers at a 1996 conference on Nile cooperation, each asserting its rights to use Nile water as it sees fit.
At the current time, tensions in the Nile River Basin are contained by a number of factors, including Egypt's political and military dominance, the civil war in the Sudan and negligible use of water by other upstream riparians. Concurrently, however, other factors are working to increase the potential for conflict over water in the basin: high population growth in both upstream and downstream countries, accompanied by subsequent demand for increases in agricultural irrigation; nascent development in Ethiopia; environmental degradation of established Egyptian irrigated land; and the possibility of an eventual end to the Sudanese war, which would spur development in Sudan. Although each of the above factors holds the potential to increase tension and cause conflict in the basin, many also represent potential areas of cooperation. Prevention of armed conflict in the Nile basin could occur in a great number of realms, from the technical to the political, from domestic solutions to regional solutions. more
